An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if
(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and
(b) a harmful contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results.
REST 2d TORTS § 13
The liability of one who commits an assault and battery or other unlawful violence to the person of another is not to be measured by the physical strength of the party injured, or his capacity to endure suffering. One of weak physical structure, or small vitality, or in ill health has as much right to protection from violence as a robust athlete; and in either case the physical injury, the bodily harm, which is actually caused by the violence, whether he be strong or weak, healthy or sickly, is the natural consequence of the wrong, and need not be specially averred. The law on this subject is correctly stated in Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) 111, as follows: ‘For instance, an assault and battery may directly result in pain and bruises, and in the aggravation of a pre-existing disease. These are the direct results of the battery. It may also result in the loss of time, expense of medical attendance, and loss of a business situation. These are perhaps direct results of the illness caused by the battery, but they are the indirect results of the battery itself.”’Murphy v. Southern Pac. Co., 31 Nev. 120, 101 P. 322, 334 (1909).
As this court has held, consent is not effective as a defense to battery “where the beating is excessively disproportionate to the consent, given or implied, or where the party injured is exposed to loss of life or great bodily harm.”
Davies v. Butler, 95 Nev. 763, 602 P.2d 605 (1979), quoting right v. Starr, 42 Nev. 441, 446, 179 P. 877 (1919).